Well Juhani, what the game in Syria now? Will the US risk another deployment?
It seems that we are, slowly but steadily, approaching an endgame in Syria. Previous news about the preparations and use of chemical weapons poured in at a time when al-Assad had lost nearly 50% of his 60,000-70,000 strong mobile forces. It was December 2012. Regime was under pressure, al-Assad stayed out of public eye and we heard 5-6 times that chemical weapons were deployed causing in average 10-25 fatalities and 50-100 casualties. The use was intended as a punishment, deterrence and compensation for the lack of conventional strength.
In May-June, al-Assad's reconstituted troops launced a counter offensive in central Syria and captured Qusayr, and later - some areas in Homs. However, Saudis and Qataris responded with increased flow of weapons to rebels which led to growing rebel pressure in Damascus, north and west of the country.
By June, the country was divided like this (source: The Guardian):
On 24 July 2013, rebels launched an attack in three areas of Damascus: Jobar, Qaboun and Barzeh. Al-Assad's forces counter attacked two days later, but failed to stop rebels. The latter made,
for the first time, advances within Damascus proper. Al-Qaeda-led rebels also invaded Alawite lands near Latakia and increased pressure in the north. A few weeks later we heard the news about a massive chemical attack in Damascus (near Jobar area) that took 300-1,200 lives and injured some 3,000 people.
Syrian economy is in tatters. 60% of arable land is located on rebel-held territory. Syrian currency is at 10-12% of its pre-war value. Industrial centres like Aleppo and Homs have been largely turned into ruins. Tourism has fallen by 95% (with many historical sights literally wiped out), foreign trade has dropped by 97% and is allowed only in Russian, Chinese and Iranian currencies. Unemployment level is over 50%. 4.5 million people of the population of 22 million have been displaced internally, over 100,000 killed, and 2 million have escaped to neighbouring countries.
Al-Assad seems to be on the ropes now. He can defend, but he cannot counterattack everywhere the need is as he faces nearly 100,000-strong insurgent force. Of the latter 10,000 are al-Qaeda (AQ) and 25,000-30,000 Syrian salafist battle group called Ahrar al-Sham (AS). These are the toughest, most disciplined and best equipped troops on the rebel side. They want to build Islamic state of Syria and they would likely turn their (increasingly sophisticated) weapons against the Western troops if these ever appeared on the theatre. Nor would they be too interested in Western air strikes against al-Assad. All they want is more weapons and ammunition to push through their solution. Consequently, Western powers deal mostly with the shrinking pool of secular rebels many of whom are switching to Islamist units. Thus, the possible Western intervention seems increasingly like a questionable proposition.
What can the US and others do? There are no good options on the table:
1) decaptitation strike against al-Assad's leadership
2) puhishing strikes against the units that deployed chemical weapons
3) supplying rebels with chemical weapons detection and protections kit
4) no-fly zone (cost of establishing - US$ 0.5 bn and maintaining - US$ 1bn a month)
5) arming rebels - chances are that these weapons end up in the hands of Islamists
6) intervention - it would be a repetition of Iraq and Afghanistan
The most likely option seems to be punishing strikes with a hint of possibility of decapitation to al-Assad.
