Topic: WE'RE STUFFED!!!

[erik]

MI5 Chief Says 34 Terror Plots Disrupted in U.K. Since Mid-2005

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-07/u-k-spy-chiefs-to-be-questioned-for-first-time-in-public-today.html

A total of 34 terrorist plots have been disrupted in the U.K. since the July 2005 bombings in London, the head of the domestic security service said.

“There have been persistent attempts of attacks of terrorism in this country,” Andrew Parker, the director general of the agency known as MI5, told Parliament’s cross-party Intelligence and Security Committee in London today. “A small number have failed because they just failed, the plans didn’t come together, but the vast majority were foiled.”

One or two of the plots that have failed each year were aimed at causing mass casualties, Parker said, adding that the “vast majority” emanated from British residents.

Parker and his colleagues from Britain’s two other spy agencies -- Iain Lobban, the director of the Government Communications Headquarters listening post and the head of MI6, the overseas intelligence agency, John Sawers -- were being questioned by lawmakers for the first time in public today.

The killing of a 25-year-old soldier outside a London barracks in May was the first attack to be treated as a terrorist incident in several years. Two men will go on trial accused of that murder later this month. In 2005, 52 people died after four Islamist suicide bombers set off explosions on underground trains and a bus in central London during the morning rush hour.

[erik]

Six rebel factions unite in Syria

November 22, 2013 | 1:15PM ET

Latest development comes as Russian president calls on western countries to persuade opposition to attend peace talks

http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/11/22/six-rebel-factionsuniteinsyria.html

The six largest Islamist rebel factions in Syria declared a new Islamic Front on Friday, forming the largest alliance of opposition fighters yet in the 2 1/2-year conflict.

Syria's fractious rebel forces have tried many times to unify their ranks and failed. Islamist rebel commanders said their new union would not only seek to oust President Bashar al-Assad but establish an Islamic state.

"This independent political, military and social formation aims to topple the Assad regime completely and build an Islamic state where the sovereignty of God almighty alone will be our reference and ruler," said Ahmed Eissa, who heads the Suqour al-Sham brigades.

The merger undermines the secular Free Syrian Army (FSA) leadership, once seen as a symbolic umbrella leadership for all the rebels but weakened by infighting and defections. It could also challenge the ascendance of Al-Qaeda-linked factions, who have grown increasingly powerful as other rebel groups have weakened.

Among the main groups that joined the front are powerful, countrywide forces such as Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Sham and Islamic Army. The Tawhid Brigade, which spearheaded the August 2012 offensive that saw rebels take large swathes of the city of Aleppo and other parts northern Syria, was another leading member. The groups are not seen as being as hard-line as the Al-Qaeda-linked rebels.

[Michael]

Al-Qaeda et al - very interesting Juhani. We are moving to the usual second generation tail off, but it doesn't appear to be happening.

[erik]

It seems that Islamists supported by Saudis have finished off moderates supported by the US.

Syrian FSA struggles in shadow of Saudi-backed opposition front

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/syria-fsa-islamic-front-geneva-ii-jarba.html#

The bombshell that Gen. Salim Idriss of the Free Syrian Army (FSA)'s Supreme Military Command dropped last week, that he would be willing to join forces with the regime against al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria, came without too much scrutiny, especially when he subsequently tried to backtrack and sugarcoat his statement. But for the observant, the subtle message was all too clear: The “moderate” Western-backed FSA rebels in Syria are on their last legs, pushed to the limit and desperate. They are making their last stand, here and now.

That this statement came out of desperation, from an organization that swore it would never deal with President Bashar al-Assad and that its only stated goal was to topple him from power, speaks volumes about the machinations, intricacies and subterfuges of the Syrian conflict, now nearing its third year and drawing ever deeper into a chaotic and messy quagmire.

On the face of it, Idriss’ moderate rebels have had crushing military setback after setback, being no match for the regime’s superior fire power and usurped on their own turf by better financed and organized jihadist Islamist rebels, who maintain a totally conflicting agenda and ideology. This position between the hammer and the anvil might have proven the last straw, as Idriss’ men threw in their lot with that of the other hapless opposition organization, the Syrian National Coalition, whose leader Ahmad al-Jarba also triumphantly announced that they were going into the fray after being provided with “assurances” by global powers.

This has much to do with the Geneva II conference, set for Jan. 22, which promises to be a veritable who’s who of top players on the Syrian pitch, with each side fielding their best team in the hopes of outmaneuvering and scoring as many points as possible against the other, while gaining as many concessions as can be achieved in the time allotted.

The fact that some sides aren’t playing ball — or at least not by the agreed upon rules, most notably the Saudis, who have opted to create their very own “Islamic Front” team — throws a spanner into the works. This new Saudi-backed Islamic Front is a fusion of Salafist jihadist Islamist groups, not as extreme in Ideology as al-Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or Jabhat al-Nusra, but nevertheless by no means mainstream like the FSA. It openly calls for Islamic Sharia rule instead of secular democracy, and was even implicated in sectarian war crimes like the Latakia province incidents documented by Human Rights Watch.

Meant to counter the growing power and influence of al-Qaeda, especially in the north of Syria, it has none the less undermined the Western-backed FSA. One need only look to the recent assassination of two FSA officers blamed on ISIS in the north, as well as the subsequent ISIS attack on the strategic border crossing of Bab al-Hawa on the Turkish border, held for over a year by FSA units. As ISIS attacked, the FSA called on Ahrar al-Sham — now part of the Islamic Front — for help. Ahrar al-Sham obliged, driving out ISIS, but at the same time taking over FSA positions, warehouses and heavy weaponry for "safe keeping."

It is this sort of cannibalization of the moderate FSA that has alarm bells ringing in Western capitals. Pretty soon there won’t actually be any FSA, at least not in terms of actual physical presence. To make matters worse, what was left of the FSA in the northeast of Syria, namely in the al-Qaeda-dominated al-Raqqa province, has disintegrated. As the Ahfad al-Rasoul Battalion splintered into different groups, many later pledged allegiance to ISIS. The same story was repeated in oil-rich Dier Ezzor, where tribal leaders opted to accept al-Qaeda’s presence instead of challenging it. In Aleppo, the FSA are being squeezed even further with ISIS openly threatening their leadership and positions in the north, just as the regime gains ground and consolidates its hold over the southern countryside of Aleppo.

And so begins the race, even against allies, to put together a workable solution that can be implemented in Syria. It is a given that many fighting factions, most notably the extremist Islamist militants, won’t abide by any such agreements, and will therefore become the future enemy of a “new Syria,” should one be agreed upon by the various players.

In the frantic buildup and diplomatic arm-twisting before Geneva II, it seems the main priority is to get everyone on board with tackling the imminent al-Qaeda menace, which friend and foe alike admit is now the biggest threat to their interests and to regional and global stability.

Neither the Americans nor the Russians nor their respective allies want to see Syria turned into a launching pad for a global jihadist movement. The nervousness is particularly acute in Europe, some of whose own citizens have joined the ranks of al-Qaeda in Syria. The blowback from those radicalized militants returning home has even prompted some to send high-level security officials to Damascus.

Apparently, removing Assad has taken a backseat to a more pressing need. Building a feasible coalition of regime and opposition forces to tackle the al-Qaeda threat seems to be the first goal of any political settlement, a priority which has the backing of all the major players in the Syrian conflict except for Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis' overt backing and funding of the Islamic Front seems specifically geared toward scuttling any such deal. In terms of Saudi calculations, curbing Iranian influence in the Middle East is their number-one strategic goal. As far as Riyadh is concerned, a failed state ruled by Sunni extremists seems preferable to the existence of any Iran-friendly regime in Syria. But despite deploying its cards via the Islamic Front, it remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia will actively defy an US attempt to form an anti-al-Qaeda coalition in Syria.

U.S.-backed Syrian rebel commander flees country

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/12/12/US-backed-Syrian-rebel-commander-flees-country/UPI-96541386829631/

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 (UPI) -- The top Western-backed Syrian rebel commander fled the country after Islamist militant fighters ran him out of his headquarters, U.S. officials said.
Free Syrian Army Gen. Salim Idris flew to the Qatari capital of Doha Sunday after fleeing to Turkey, the officials told the Wall Street Journal.

"He fled as a result of the Islamic Front taking over his headquarters," a senior U.S. official said.

An Islamic Front spokesman said Idris, an East German-trained electronics professor who was a Syrian army general until he defected to the rebel side in July 2012, fled to Turkey.

The New York Times said Idris flew temporarily to Doha but was now back in Turkey, where he has a house.

The 13-month-old U.S.-backed Syrian National Coalition, which supports the FSA, is based in Doha.

The Obama administration is urging Idris to return to Syria, the U.S. officials told the Journal.

The ultraconservative Islamic Front also took over key warehouses holding lethal and non-lethal weapons intended for moderate fighters in northern Syria, the White House said.

The warehouses were controlled by the Supreme Military Council, the moderate opposition umbrella group that includes the FSA and coordinates U.S. aid distribution, the White House said.

Idris' departure from his command and the Islamic Front's seizure of FSA military gear Friday prompted the United States and Britain to freeze delivery of non-lethal military aid to rebels in northern Syria, U.S. and British officials said Wednesday.

The aid suspension was temporary and aid could flow again, administration officials said.

The United States is still providing humanitarian aid, distributed through organizations including the United Nations, White House spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters.

The administration is still trying to determine the circumstances of the Friday takeover and "the status of U.S. equipment and supplies," Earnest said.

The Islamic Front is a new alliance of seven powerful Islamist fighter groups that broke with the moderate, U.S.-backed opposition Nov. 22. It says it does not include al-Qaida-linked rebels but also has no ties with the SNC.

The turn of events is the strongest sign yet the U.S.-allied FSA armed opposition structure is crumpling under extremist pressure, the Journal said.

It also weakens the Obama administration's struggles to put together a Jan. 22 peace conference in Geneva, Switzerland, with Syrian rebels and the Assad regime, the newspaper said.

The Front also seized the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, near the warehouses, about 25 miles west of Syria's largest city and commercial center, Aleppo

Turkey shut its side of the border in response.

The Front's fast-growing strength prompted Washington and its allies to hold direct talks in recent days with Front representatives, the Journal said, citing Western officials.

The goal of the talks was to persuade some Islamists to back the Jan. 22 peace conference, the newspaper said.

Western officials believe a lasting peace agreement would be possible only with Islamist backing, the officials said.

The SMC has already agreed to participate in the peace talks.

[Michael]

Thanks for the update Juhani.

[erik]

Where are the good guys?

The rise of jihadists and the worsening sectarian strife in Syria have put Western backers of the rebel opposition in a quandary

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21591868-rise-jihadists-and-worsening-sectarian-strife-syria-have-put-western



WHAT to do when the party you have been backing loses sway? That is the question facing Western supporters of the Syrian National Coalition, the umbrella group that claims to represent the main political opposition, and its armed wing of loosely allied rebel militias, known as the Free Syrian Army. Especially on the ground in Syria, these relatively moderate groups have been losing out to other factions, particularly jihadist ones. As a result, the American administration and European governments are in a bind.

As the jihadists grow in strength, some Western officials are starting quietly to advocate re-engagement with Bashar Assad, Syria’s president, while others think the only course left is to work with devout Islamists who reject the extremists but who nonetheless refuse to be part of the coalition hitherto backed by the West. With negotiations supposed to start in Geneva on January 22nd, Western governments are still puzzling over which military factions to back on the ground. “I’m not sure where we are,” says a Western diplomat involved in preparing for the conference.

The immediate cause of this mess is the growth of al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Greater Syria), known as ISIS, the most ruthless of the groups, has spread across northern and eastern Syria, while another al-Qaeda bunch, Jabhat al-Nusra, still thrives, too.

This has caused alarm in Western capitals and among Syrians who mutter that the extremists may be even worse than a regime that has used fighter jets, barrel-bombs and chemical warfare against civilians. With Russia and Iran doggedly behind him, Mr Assad has stood firm.

That leaves only one non-al-Qaeda opposition lot with real power: a newish clutch of seven beefy Islamist groups called the Islamic Front. This includes Ahrar al-Sham, a large Salafist outfit, and the Army of Islam, a collection of groups around the capital, Damascus. The front has distanced itself from the military wing of the coalition, headed by Selim Idriss, a defected brigadier, but also from ISIS.

But Western policymakers are unsure how to relate to the front. Coalition members have denounced it as too conservative and undemocratic yet have tried to foster links to it. American diplomats have been in touch with it, but the West is generally wary of becoming too close to it because its fighters have been guilty of brutal sectarian attacks on Alawite civilians in Syria’s coastal area, home to the Assads’ sect.

The West signalled its unease on December 11th when American and British officials confirmed that non-lethal aid to Syria’s rebels in the north had been frozen after the Islamic Front seized several rebel bases and warehouses belonging to the coalition close to the Turkish border. Two days before, Razan Zeitouneh, a secular lawyer who was prominent in peaceful protests against the regime two years ago, was kidnapped from her office, possibly by a group within the front.

Now Western governments seem more preoccupied with the jihadist threat than with forcing out Mr Assad and his regime. Hence the notion, aired recently by veteran American diplomats such as Ryan Crocker, that the least bad course would now be to talk to Mr Assad, with whom the West has already been co-operating over the removal of his chemical weapons.

It is not yet clear who, in any event, will represent Syria’s opposition at Geneva. The Russians suggest groups outside the coalition. While they and the Americans will sit at the table, it is unclear whether Iran and Saudi Arabia, which has funded the Islamic Front, will be there. Without them, it will be harder to make a deal stick.

In a reminder of the wider peril generated by Syria’s agony, a big car-bomb exploded near Lebanon’s border with Syria on December 17th, probably aimed at Hizbullah, Lebanon’s Shia militia that has thrown its weight behind Mr Assad, widening Lebanon’s own stark sectarian rifts. A massive influx of at least 1m Syrian refugees, most of them destitute, is making Lebanon, with its mixed populace of 4m, increasingly tense. Many are crammed into flats, some sleep under bridges, others are packed into already crowded Palestinian refugee camps or are scattered in tents across the bitterly cold Bekaa valley close to the Syrian border. The UN reckons that the flood of Syrian refugees across the region could exceed 4m by the end of next year. Already 2.3m have fled abroad and 6.5m have been internally displaced. This week the UN began raising $6.5 billion in aid for Syria, its biggest-ever appeal.

[erik]

Zahran Alloush: His Ideology and Beliefs
By Joshua Landis
December 15, 2013

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/zahran-alloush/

Zahran Alloush is the military chief of the Islamic Front the newly founded super militia that reportedly represents 45,000 fighters. As such, he could turn out to be the most powerful man in rebel held Syria.

Hassan Hassan argues in his article, “Why Syria’s Islamic Front is bad news for radical groups,” that the Jihadist and radical Islamist rhetoric of the Front can be discounted as a positioning ploy, but that the new group is really bad news for al-Qaida groups in Syria because it will stem the slide toward radicalism in Syria and be able to face down militias on their right.

It is too early to know if the Islamic Front will take on the formidable al-Qaida groups in Syria. Despite frequent tensions, the main groups that came together to form the Islamic Front have worked hand in glove with al-Qaida linked forces, particularly al-Nusra, on most battle fronts and recent offensives against the regime.

Zahran Alloush’s rhetoric and propaganda videos provide much insight into his world view, attitude toward Syria’s religious minorities, and vision for Syria’s future. The difference between his ideology and that of al-Qaida groups is not profound. Rather, it is one of shades of grey.

Perhaps the most important video Alloush has produced is this one:
كلمة الشيخ المجاهد زهران علوش للامة وتحدية للرافضة Speech of the Mujahid Zahran Alloush to the Umma on the challange of the “Raafida,” (rejectionists or Shiites).

Alloush uses the great Umayyad desert palace of Caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik as the backdrop for this dramatic video.


This is an anti-Shiite tirade and “bring-back-the-Umayyad-Empire” propaganda piece. It shows how sectarian Alloush is. He refers to Shiites, and reduces the Nusayris into this grouping, as “Majous”, or crypto-Iranians. “Majous” is the old term for pre-Islamic Persians or Zoroastrians. Arab Christians use the term in Christmas carols about the Magi, or “three kings from the Orient” (or east) who come to pay homage to Jesus—Magi are Persians or Easterners. Here it is an Islamic term of abuse meant to suggest that Alawites and Iranians not only have the wrong religion but also the wrong ethnicity—they are not Arabs, but crypto-Iranians. The term Majous is used in many rebel videos to refer to the Assad regime—”al-nizam al-majousi”—or simply to refer to Shiites (or Alawites) generally. It demonstrates how demonized the Alawites are in the propaganda of the new Islamic Front.

Zahran calls for cleansing Damascus of all Shiites and Nusayris. (“Nusayris” is the old term that referred to the Alawites prior to the adoption of “Alawite.” It is considered a term of abuse by Alawites. “Nusayri” refers to the founder of the religion, Ibn Nusayr, and is used by rebels to underscore the assertion that the Alawite religion is man-made and not sent from heaven. For the same reason, Muslims object to the old Christian appellation, Muhammadans, because it suggests that Islam was founded by Muhammad and not God. Christians, of course, believe there is no problem being named after their founder, Christ – but, of course, Christ is considered to be God. Not so Muhammad or Ibn Nusayr by their followers.) Alloush calls for ridding Damascus and Greater Syria of the evil works and impure deeds of the Nusayris, using Qur’anic language throughout to underline their deviant ways. Such language makes Assad’s effort to demonize the revolutionaries and rebels easy. On hearing this sort of talk from the leaders of the revolution, Alawites and other non-Sunni sects worry that their struggle is a fight for their very existence. Unfortunately, the regime treats the opposition with the same sort of extreme language, calling them tefforists, takfiris, and al-Qaida who are not true Syrians. Bigotry and religious intolerance has become a hallmark of the Syrian struggle as both sides try to annul the humanity of the other and completely dismiss each other’s concerns as conspiracies derived from evil. Iranian Ayatollahs have recently issued fatwas of their own, legitimizing religious war in Syria. See: Prominent Shiite Cleric Backs Fighting in Syria about Iran-based Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri, one of the mentors of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

Islamic Front versus al-Qaida Ideology

This video and the language of Alloush demonstrates how difficult it is to draw a clear line between the ideology of the Islamic Front and that of the al-Qaida groups. They both embrace foreign jihadists and encourage them to come Syria to join the fight. They both call for the resurrection of an Islamic Empire and they both look back to the Golden Age of Islam for the principles upon which the new state will be founded. Their political philosophy and blue print for the future is largely based on a similar reading of Islamic history and the Qur’an.

Some analysts try to draw a clear line between al-Qaida and the Islamic Front, insisting that the former support changing Syria’s borders and seek to establish a Caliphate while the latter are Syrian Nationalists. Unfortunately, this distinction is not evident in their rhetoric. Both idealize Islamic Empire, both reject democracy and embrace what they call shari’a, both welcome jihadists from the “Islamic Umma,” both fly the black flag of Islam rather than the Syrian flag as their predominant emblem. The Islamic Front is dominated by Syrians who do have clear parochial interests, whereas ISIS is run by an Iraqi. Foreigners play a dominate role in its command, but this is not so with the Islamic Front. All the same, their ideologies overlap in significant ways.

Geneva II seems very far away when considering the statements of Zahran Alloush. The effort by moderate FSA leaders to recruit Zahran Alloush to their side and to set him against al-Qaida will be difficult. Equally, the US effort to take a new look at him seems driven by equal parts wishful thinking and desperation now that Salim Idriss has been thoroughly disgraced and driven from Syria. Alloush is unlikely to go to Geneva or to embrace any sort of compromise with either Assad or the remains of the Assad regime if Assad were to step aside, as the US demands.

Here are a bunch of tweets and articles underlying how controversial Zahran Alloush is. His Islamic Army is responsible for Douma, the town in which Razan Zeitouneh was kidnapped this week. She is a human rights lawyer and represented what was left of the original Syrian uprising.

Alloush’s Detractors

Zahran has a number of domestic enemies. In the Damascus region, many fighters who are not under his command seem to think that he is a self-promoter. He is also a prime target of the ISIS. He seems to receive the brunt of their social media attacks together with Adnan Arour. The Syrian opposition is uncomfortable to see a leader break away from the pack. This is why Zahran seems to elicit such strong attacks from his competitors and those who do not fall under his command.

Is Alloush the most powerful leader in rebel-held Syria?

He holds the title of military commander of the most powerful militia in Syria, but that is only if we assume that the IF is actually one militia, as it claims. In reality, it is made up of a number of powerful militias. Hassan Aboud, the head of Ahrar al-Sham, may actually be more powerful than Alloush, although he is listed only as the “Chief of the Political Office.” This reminds me of the secret military committee that drove forward the Baathist coups of the 1960s. It was formed by minority officers who found themselves exiled in Egypt by Nasser during the UAR. The leaders were Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Umran, Major Salah Jadid and Captain Hafez al-Assad. Like the present Islamic Front, they were supposed to be acting as one. But as they came to power and ceased working behind the scenes, they turned against each other. Assad ended up on the top after using his superior political skills and military base to outmaneuver the others and arrest them. Alloush may look like the strongest member of the IF on paper, but others may have superior force on the ground. Only time will tell.

Alloush and Jabhat al-Nusra

Alloush has gone out of his way to keep good relations with Jabhat al-Nusra. In this video he goes to some lengths to explain that his relationship with Nusra is one of brotherhood with only superficial ideological differences that can be settled with shari’a and discussions. This supports my argument that the ideological differences between the Front and al-Qaida are not deep. He says that Washington’s proscription of Nusra as a tefforist group does not concern him.

The Islamic Front and the Free Syrian Army

The Islamic Front also overran the Bab al-Hawa crossing into Turkey this week and routed the moderate Free Syrian Army divisions that were loyal to the Supreme Military Command and indirectly represented US efforts to arm Syrian opponents of Assad. Salim Idriss, the putative head of the FSA and direct link to US support for the FSA,  fled into Turkey. Here is an excellent video made by an FSA officer who was at one of the arms warehouses when the Islamic Front overran it and stole its contents. He was stripped of his clothes and underclothing while being held upon the ground at gunpoint. Here is Salim Idriss’ account of the events. He denies that the Islamic Front attacked his headquarters and insists that it was protecting his position. US officials have asked the Islamic Front to return US equipment and vehicles taken from the warehouses. In the meantime, Ambassador Ford has met with Alloush to discuss the possibility of his going to Geneva.

Addendum:

Aron Lund, who write and edits the superb Syria in Crisis Blog for the Carnegie website, gave this reply to my questions about the Warehouse incident:

The warehouse attack – it is getting more complicated. I’ve now heard four or five stories about which group it was that first attacked the warehouses (ISIS, JN, SRF, IF, maybe with SMC defectors involved), prompting SMC to call in IF, which overran the whole place (and then decided to stay there, and now they may or may not give the stuff back). It’s tied in with other problems as well, the whole area seems to be bubbling with conflict. Ahrar al-Sham has been fighting Jamal Maarouf’s SRF all across Jabal al-Zawiya, and both seem to have been kidnapping each others members. They now struck a deal for SRF hand back the stolen goods via Jabhat al-Nosra, but I’m not clear if these are the same things that were taken from the stockpiles in Babisqa/Bab el-Hawa; I think not.

Correction (December 16, 2013)

According to Aljazeera, the Ford-Alloush meeting was the idea of a well connected person who attended a meeting between Ford and Idriss. He then suggested that he could bring the IF to the table. Evidently, the guy failed and the meeting never happened. The IF denied it as well. The meeting was based on gossip, rumor and news articles quoting Ford say that the US had not precluded working with Islamists. Also the Washington Post quoted senior US officials to say: “We don’t have a problem with the Islamic Front.”

[erik]

Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/up-to-11000-foreign-fighters-in-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation offers its latest assessment of how many foreigners are fighting in Syria's civil war, which countries they hail from, and other key data.

Since ICSR published its first estimate in April, the issue of foreign fighters in Syria has become a major concern for Western governments. More reports have emerged since, though few have accurately gauged the full extent and evolution of the phenomenon.

This ICSR Insight provides an update of our April estimate, offering the most comprehensive and richly resourced account of the Syrian foreign fighter phenomenon from open sources. Based on more than 1,500 sources, we estimate that up to 11,000 individuals from 74 nations have become opposition fighters in Syria -- nearly double our previous estimate. Among Western Europeans, the number has more than tripled from (up to) 600 in April to 1,900 now.

HOW MANY HAVE GONE?

We estimate that -- from late 2011 to 10 December 2013 -- between 3,300 and 11,000 individuals have gone to Syria to fight against the Assad government. These figures include those who are currently present as well as those who have since returned home, been arrested or killed.

Based on the credibility of various sources, our own judgement, and the feedback we have received since publishing our April estimate, we believe the "true" figure to be above 8,500. This would mean that the numbers have nearly doubled since April, with a particularly steep increase among non-Arabs, especially Westerners.

While Arabs and Europeans continue to represent the bulk of foreign fighters (up to 80 per cent), we have identified individuals from Southeast Asia, North America, Australia, and (non-Arab) Africa. Overall, we believe that residents and citizens from at least 74 countries have joined militant opposition groups in Syria.

(For a more detailed explanation on sources and limitations, see further below.)

WESTERN EUROPE

We estimate that the number of fighters from Western Europe ranges from 396 to 1,937. Compared to April, when we provided an estimate of 135 to 590, this represents a threefold increase.

This upsurge cannot be explained by increased reporting alone. Official figures tell a similar story: the French and Danish governments have doubled their estimates since the spring, while the figures provided by the Belgian, British and German governments have quadrupled.

Western Europeans now represent up to 18 per cent of the foreign fighter population in Syria, with most recruits coming from France (63-412), Britain (43-366), Germany, (34-240), Belgium (76-296), and the Netherlands (29-152).

Adjusting for population size, the most heavily affected countries are Belgium (up to 27 foreign fighters per million), Denmark (15), the Netherlands (9), Sweden (9), Norway (8 ), and Austria (7).

The detailed figures are as follows:


MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA

Individuals from Middle Eastern countries continue to represent the majority of foreign fighters (around 70 per cent). We estimate that up to 6,774 non-Syrian Arabs and an additional 523 non-Arabs from the (wider) region have gone to Syria.

The five countries with the largest numbers of foreign fighters in Syria are all part of the Middle East: Jordan is the single biggest contributor (up to 2,089), followed by Saudi Arabia (1,016), Tunisia (970), Lebanon (890), and Libya (556).

It must be noted, however, that the Middle Eastern figures are less reliable than those for Western Europe, as governments are less forthcoming with official estimates and there is less reporting of individual cases.

The detailed breakdown is as follows:



OTHER REGIONS

The most important regions for foreign fighter recruitment outside Western Europe and the Middle East are the Balkans and the countries of the former Soviet Union. In the Balkans, the largest contributors of foreign fighters are Kosovo (4-150), Albania (9-140), and Bosnia (18-60), with smaller numbers coming from Macedonia (3-20), Serbia (3), and Bulgaria (1). Among the former Soviet countries, the most significant are Russia (9-423 excluding Chechnya; 36-186 for Chechnya), Kazakhstan (14-150), Ukraine (50), and Kyrgyzstan (9-30), with all others providing a dozen or less.

The most prominent non-European Western countries are Australia (23-205), Canada (9-100), and the United States (17-60). Other notable countries of origin are Pakistan (7-330), China (6-100), Somalia (5-68), and Afghanistan (12-23).

The only significant black spot in our survey is India for which no credible reports have been available. All other countries are believed to have contributed less than a dozen foreign fighters.

ANALYSIS

Our figures raise numerous questions which cannot be fully answered by the data alone. Even so, our data may help to inform a number of important areas of debate.

What groups do they join?

Only about twenty-percent of the sources stated group affiliations. Of those, the vast majority are with Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) -- the two militant opposition groups that are closest to al Qaeda.

To a much lesser extent, fighters were also reported to be members of Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-l-Ansar, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, Katibat Suqur al-Izz, Liwa al-Umma, and Harakat Sham al-Islam, among others.

What explains the steep rise?

It is difficult to be certain, but it may be no coincidence that the period since publication of our first estimate has coincided with the more forceful and open involvement by the Lebanese group Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias and Iranian government forces on Assad's side. This may have reinforced and strengthened the perception among some Sunnis that the conflict is fundamentally sectarian, and that Sunnis need to stand together in order to halt the (Shia) enemy's advance. Indeed, this type of solidarity has driven a number of previous foreign fighter mobilisations involving Sunni militants.

Will the trend continue?

Our prediction is that foreign fighter recruitment will continue, albeit at a slower rate. The winter months will impose harsher conditions and may deter potential recruits from joining. Even so, in the absence of a peaceful resolution, the basic attraction of going to Syria will remain. In this respect, the upcoming Geneva II conference is unlikely to make a difference, because those who are sympathetic to the armed opposition -- and, indeed, most of the militants themselves -- view Geneva II as an unrepresentative stitch-up, the outcome of which they have already stated will not bind them.

How does the current mobilisation compare?

The current mobilization is more significant than every other instance of foreign fighter mobilisation since the Afghanistan war in the 1980s. Although conflicts like Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan went on for (much) longer, none of those conflicts mobilised as many foreigners. Even the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s didn't attract as many foreigners as Syria in the same period of time. Indeed, for a number of smaller countries -- Denmark and Belgium, for example -- the number of residents that have gone to fight in Syria may already exceed the combined totals for all previous conflicts.

How foreign is the Syrian opposition?

As noted in our earlier estimate, the relatively large number of foreign fighters does not mean that the fight against Assad is led or dominated by "foreign forces" or "outsiders", as has been suggested by President Assad. Even if our highest estimate turns out to be true, the "foreign contingent" still doesn't represent more than 10 per cent of the militant opposition, which is thought to number more than 100,000 men.

SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS

The aim of this Insight is to gauge the overall extent and evolution of the phenomenon, detect trends and draw basic comparisons. We are under no illusion that the underlying data is incomplete and -- in many cases -- ambiguous. Given the nature of the subject, no estimate of foreign fighter flows will ever be exact.

Our dataset contains approximately 1,500 open source items which have been collected since November 2011. They include: media reports about foreign fighters in English, Arabic and several other languages (and from both sides of the conflict); government estimates; and statements about foreign fighters by jihadist groups, typically published in online extremist forums and on social media.

For each country, we provide "low" and "high" estimates, with low figures including only fully confirmed cases where names are known, and high figures representing the maximum number of individuals based on credible sources.

We are more confident in our figures now than we were at the time of our first estimate. The Syrian foreign fighter issue has received far more attention and we consequently had more independent and journalistic sources to cross-reference and compare. Also, more governments have published official figures, making it easier to verify data and get a sense of the phenomenon's size and evolution (where those figures are judged to be credible).

Still, there are many ambiguities and potential sources of error of which we are fully aware:

Our figures represent overall aggregates, not the number of fighters that are currently involved in combat. To estimate the latter, one would have to know exactly how many individuals have died or been arrested and how many have returned to their home countries, which -- at this point -- we have no consistently reliable methodology for doing.

The figures for Western countries are more likely to be valid than those for non-Western countries, partly because there has been more independent reporting (and therefore more sources to cross-reference), and partly because many governments have periodically published credible figures.

That said, not all official figures can be compared. While some governments only include "known extremists" in their foreign fighter estimates, others include individuals who -- despite having no extremist ties -- are nevertheless judged to be likely to enter Syria with the intention of becoming involved in combat.

Another potential source of ambiguity is individuals' citizenship. Our figures typically refer to countries' residents, which may include citizens of other countries. As a result, we suspect, for example, that the number of Bosnian nationals in Syria is significantly higher than the number of foreign fighters from Bosnia that are listed in our tables. The same is true for Chechens, a large number of whom are residents of Russia.

Finally, we realise that there may be a significant number of unknowns, including aspiring foreign fighters travelling under the "cover" of humanitarian convoys, and individuals who went to Syria for humanitarian reasons but joined a militant group after spending time in the country.

Despite these limitations, we feel that there is value in publishing this estimate. Our data is richer and thicker than the sources used in other estimates, and we strongly believe that public discussions should be based on the soundest possible foundation. Moreover, while individual figures may have their limitations, we are confident in our assessment of overall trends.

[Michael]

Take a read of this article, and give up on any belief your actions can't be monitored, and isn't being monitored. Then realise the crims can also use these techniques, and you'll understand we are entering the world of total surveillance, vulnerability and exploitation. What remains for us to hold precious and personal, now becomes the big question.

Just always remember, they are only looking for what they know about. Retaining financial security will then become the hardest task - individual autonomy in beliefs and action will need to be forgone.

http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/nsa-can-turn-your-iphone-into-a-spy-says-privacy-advocate-jacob-appelbaum-20131231-hv77r.html

[Nick]

I have page on facebook were I post news I find interesting, and its currently focused on mass surveillance.

https://www.facebook.com/Wisdomattheendoftheuniverse

Some of the articles I posted:
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/the-real-war-on-reality/?_r=0

http://media.ccc.de/browse/conferences/sigint13/konferenz_mp6_og_-_2013-07-06_15:00_-_e-mobility_as_a_privacy_game_changer_-_tilman_frosch_-_5068.html

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/dec/20/nsa-surveillance-programme-get-worse

[Michael]

Nifty little site Nick. You get many interested?

[Nick]

Just opened it recently, so far no.

I have a philosophy club that meets at my house the first or second Saturday of every month, and that page is supposed to be for them to come discuss things between meetings. So far no one is using it; my philosophy club is pretty lame at this point in time. 

Here is another article I found:

http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/06/why-should-we-even-care-if-the-government-is-collecting-our-data/276732/

[erik]

Watch out, there is a brewing conflict in Ukraine. Russian president Putin asked and received a permission to use military force against Ukraine. If it blew up, it would be one of the largest wars since World War II.

Ukrainian forces on full alert

[Michael]

How fast things escalate. I don't understand the reasons for this, but I have the feeling that when Russia mobilises it forces, it doesn't sit on the border. I fully expect they will take control of Ukraine. What are the other powers going to do?

[Michael]

As I thought. Well come on Juhani, what's going on there?